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SOUTHERN AFRICAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION 1983-84: A STUDY IN SURVIVAL
By Reginald Herbold Green
We have been watching SADCC's progress to determine if it 
was going to be another East African Community. It is
clear not only it isn't but that it is not making the
same mistakes of over-heavy and centralised bureaucracy 
as other existing regional programmes. We thought it 
time to reflect that confidence in our practical support. 
(Pledges totalling $C 125 million.)
- C. Bassett, Vice President CIDA, 
speaking for Canada at Lusaka, 
SADCC, 19841
Droughts are endemic to much of the SADCC region, and
since 1978 each of the SADCC States has suffered from
abnormally severe weather conditions for one or more 
years. The 1982/83 agricultural season has seen one of 
the worst droughts in living memory, creating an abnormal 
demand for food imports and food aid as well as 
rehabilitation aid to allow farmers to restore production 
when the drought breaks. Potentially even more 
devastating is the threat to the resilience and 
viability of the fragile economies of our region.
- SADCC, Overview for 
Lusaka SADCC2
The Conference deplored continued South African actions 
which denied peace and stability to the SADCC region. It 
noted that there were some apparent signs of a less 
aggressive stance by South Africa and recognised that 
continued international pressure on South Africa was 
essential to bring these signs to fruition and bring 
about a process of peaceful change in the region.
Communique, Lusaka SADCC
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Progress In Adversity: An Overview
1983-94 has been an appalling year for most of the Southern African region's 
independent states. The continued impact of adverse international economic 
conditions, of aggravated drought and of South African destabilisation have 
gravely debilitated the economies of eight of the nine SADCC members.^ Only 
Botswana has been able to regain external balance and resume economic progress 
while the economic situation and short term prospects of Angola, Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia can only be described as dire. The 
apparent South African initiatives to de-esculate destabilisation are both
problematic and tentative.
In that context the survival of SADCC as a functioning body is remarkable -
economic adversity has in Africa and the Americas tended to have a very 
negative impact on even fairly firmly established cooperation groupings. 
Indeed, SADCC has not merely survived - it has expanded the scope and depth of 
its coordination work and continued to mobilize funds for implementation. In 
a very economically troubled region it is a clear example of success.
Adversity in this case appears to have reinforced, much more than it has
weakened, perceptions of common interests and of the need to pursue
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coordinated, regionally agreed priorities toward furthering them.
The same response - albeit in a lower key - can be seen in the Arusha Accord 
re-establishing normal economic relations between Kenya and Tanzania and 
opening explorations on new forms of economic cooperation among the members of 
the late East African Community. So too progress on the "Central Corrider"
transport links among Tanzania-Zaire-Burundi-Rwanda and Uganda has continued.
/
While the case of the Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern Africa 
is more problematic, it has survived, established its first functioning 
programme (a payments clearing house) and scheduled its initial preferential 
tariff cuts for mid-1984.
SADCC's Programme: Momentum Maintenance
By 1983/84 SADCC had to demonstrate both that programme articulation continued 
and that a substantial number of projects were passing from the drawing board 
through final studies and financing to implementation. This it did.^
The most rapid advances in 1983/84 were in Agriculture (especially Crops
Research and Drought/Food Security) and Industry. Coordinated agricultural 
research moved closer to major project operation in respect to drought 
resistent grains and grain legumes. Links were developed with the 
International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) and 
the ongoing series of technical group meetings of agricultural specialists as 
well as those of agriculture senior officials and ministers were stepped up.
/
Food Security/Drought was pushed into prominence by the series of bad weather
years whi-ch have plagued most SADC members since 1978 and particularly in the
1981-82 and 1 9 8 2 -8 3 (and apparently 1983-84) crop years.^ The programmes
outlined by the states and coordinated for the Lusaka SADCC totalled over $500
million including a limited amount of food aid (largely sought earlier on a
bilateral basis) and much more extensive rehabilitation, drought impact
o
limitation and food production boosting projects. These are seen as broadly 
coordinated elements to enhancing regional food security - including eventual 
regional food reserves albeit the degree of direct multi-country involvement 
in individual projects or their output is lower in this sector than in others.
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At Maseru the first articulated industrial sector priority list was criticized
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as uncoordinated albeit a high proportion of projects did, in fact, receive 
indications of interest. Further studies and emphasis on the logic of the
agricultural input/construction material core of the priority list were
organised by the coordinating country (Tanzania) leading to a January 1984
sectoral workshop in Harare.^ This was SADCC’s first sectoral meeting with
donors and investors and also the first in which companies (over 80) as well
as countries and international agencies (over 20) participated. Together with
followup at the Lusaka SADCC, Harare led to indications of definite interest
for almost all of the 88 projects (55 for implementation and 33 for study)
presented. While the firmness of the interest/commitment varies and exact
amounts under discussion (up to $700 million)^ and required (up to $1,500 
1 1million) are not very firm it appears that with sustained followup by member
states and the coordinating country a number of projects can move to contract 
and design stage in 1984-85 and to construction by 1985-86.
Transport and Communications remains SADCC’s largest sector, the one with the 
greatest involvement in project design and financial mobilisation and 
possessing the largest (and most formal) institutional structure based on the 
Southern African Transport and Communications Council in Maputo at the
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technical and Ministerial and official committees at the policy level. It
also has the largest number of identified priority projects - nearly 120 - and
of projects completed under implementation or fully/partially funded - over
half. By the end of 1983 nearly $700 million in definite commitments to
projects had been secured and up to $450 million more was under negotiation -
out of somewhat over $2,000 million total foreign exchange cost. Increased
attention to data base development, coordinating specialised training and
dialogue on how to build up cooperation/coordination in operations (especially
12cargo routing and timing) was noticable over 1982-84.
However, the finance still to be secured is also large and, at the 1983 rate
of definite new commitments of about $200 million, would take seven years to
13raise and perhaps twelve to complete or virtually complete implementation. 
Further, three basic port and access route clusters - Dar es Salaam, Beira and
Maputo have definite commitments of only 6$, 18$ and 22$ of total costs
14respectively versus over 50$ in civil aviation and telecommunications. 
SATCC and the coordinating country (Mozambique) are well aware of these limits 
to the undoubted successes achieved to date. These three routes are critical 
to restoring and increasing regional self sufficiency in transport and in
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creating a viable regional network to facilitate trade expansion.
In respect to Tazara (Tanzania-Zambia Railway) 3 and Dar es Salaam Harbour , 
and perhaps to a Malawi link to TAZARA, progress toward securing funds - 
especially from China, Federal Germany, IDA and the Nordic countries now seems 
to be gathering momentum in part as a result of SATCC technical and 
promotional work. Studies in respect to Beira and Maputo are now virtually 
complete and - especially if security improves - breakthroughs on the 
financing front like to those in 1982-83 on the port of Ncala and rail link to 
Malawi may be attainable in 1984-85. Once these routes are fully operational 
Zambia and Zimbabwe can achieve substantial cost - as well as broader
political economic - savings by ending or sharply reducing dependence on South 
African ports and both Mozambique and Tanzania would benefit from significant 
transit traffic earnings while Botswana would have a practicable regional 
route to the sea ending its near total dependence on the South African rail 
and port systems.
The energy sector has built up substantial momentum over 1982-84. Except for 
the regional petroleum personnel development centre in Luanda - and probably
by the end of 1984 projects to enable Mozambique to supply additional power to 
Zimbabwe and Zambia/Tanzania to rehabilitate the Dar-Ndola pipeline - this
does not yet lie in capital projects under implementation. Rather it consists
of progress toward building a coordinated regional data base, analyzing 
options, articulating more specific topical and project studies and building 
up a habit of cooperation.1^
Even broadly favourable commentators have suggested that demand projections
are too optimistic and the stress on multi-country (as opposed to purely
18national) solutions too low and rising too slowly. This overlooks the long 
gestation period of major power projects and high cost of power shortages -
which make too low demand projections very expensive and the fact that
building up a coordinated versus a narrowly national approach to power
questions requires experience in joint reviews of data and working together. 
In fact demand estimates will be reviewed in specific studies and four 
projects involving seven countries (Botswana, Zambia, Swaziland, Mozambique, 
Malawi, Tanzania, Zimbabwe) are under study in respect to electricity 
generation. While energy project feasibility, design and financing stages are 
notably slow the present base gives cause to expect a breakthough to
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implementation in a few years time. The thorough, step by step approach 
adopted by the coordinating country (Angola) appears to be paying off,.
Manpower Development has continued to broaden the scope of its studies and has
begun to develop concrete projects especially in teacher training and health
but has not made a breakthrough to substantial operational external interest. 
Two new initiatives for 1984-85 are intended to revitalize the sectoral
programme. The first is closer liaison between the manpower development
coordinating country (Swaziland) and sectoral meetings and those of other 
sectors in respect to specialized training projects critical to sectoral 
development. An earlier partial example of this is the veterinary faculty in 
Zimbabwe designed to serve several SADCC states. An early new initiative is
likely to be in mining where the initial regional projects developed by the 
coordinating country (Zambia) relate to expanding the region's existing
technical and professional level training institutions to relieve the acute 
bottlenecks in personnel availabilty (citizen or expatriate) at these levels. 
The second new approach - in response to the successful Harare Industrial
Workshop - is a sectoral international workshop with agencies and personnel 
specializing in manpower development scheduled for Mbabane in the second half
-10-
of 1984.
SADCC's commitment to developing a sectoral programme in trade dates from the
1 q1980 Lusaka Declaration. 17 However, largely because SADCC saw production as
central and trade a consequential means overt attention to coordination of
regional trade expansion did not begin until 1983 although the topic has
repeatedly arisen in manufacturing sector discussions. A further complicating
factor was the existence of the Preferential Trade Area for East and Southern
Africa whose 14 members include 5 SADCC states and whose approach embodied in
its 1981 Treaty is not identical to, and could prove incompatible with, the
Lusaka Declaration’s emphasis on building up trade links from a coordinated
20network of bilateral trade accords.
In fact SADCC has increased and begun to coordinate invisible trade - in 
transport and communications - but this poses different and lesser problems 
than does trade in goods. Further several SADCC states - notably Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique, Angola, Zambia and Tanzania have built up networks of bilateral 
agreements with target trade levels, key products and rough guidelines for 
clearing imbalances. Intraregional trade in goods is not negligible -
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approximating $300 million in 19 8121 but is still only 5% of total SADCC 
members’ external trade. About 45? relates to Zimbabwe and 12 to 15? each to 
Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique so that there is substantial imbalance in 
participation.
In October 1983 the SADCC Ministers of Trade and Finance met in Arusha and 
agreed a report to the February 1984 Lusaka Council of Ministers. The Council 
called for two further studies - one on trade proper by a regional team headed 
by Tanzanian IMF Alternate Executive Director Edwin Mtei and one on clearing 
and financing arrangements by an external consultant - to be considered at the 
July 1984 Gaborone Council of Ministers meeting.
There does not seem to be disagreement on what would constitute a basic
sectoral programme were it to be adopted. There are reservations - apparently
22particularly by Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi - both on timing and on the need 
to avoid overlap or conflict with the PTA.
SADCC’s progress toward consolidating its central secretariat with a small 
full time core staff and part time or specialist consultants as needed
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suffered a severe setback in March 1984 when Executive Secretary Arthur 
Blumeris died suddenly from a heart attack. The Chairman of the Standing 
Committee of Officials, Lebang Mpotokwane (who had acted as de facto Secretary 
General prior to the establishment of the secretariat), became interim 
Executive Secretary with a permanent second Executive Secretary to be named by 
the SADCC Heads of State and Government probably at the July 1984 Gaborone 
Summit.
SDACC Lusaka - A Working Conference
Lusaka on 2-3 February 1984, was SADCC's fifth annual conference with invited 
guests and donors. In the view of SADCC Ministerial Chairman Peter Mmusi and 
of many other veteran participants it was the most successful since the 1980 
Maputo launching Conference. It was a working conference with pledging one 
among a number of topics since - unlike Maputo - there were operational 
achievements and problems to discuss and an ongoing set of programmes to 
review.
Pledging - rather to the irritation of the press - has become less of a
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tallying of broad intentions and more of a noting for further action of 
specific indications of interest in or commitments to individual projects. In 
addition, with ongoing programmes and sectoral followup, it has become less
concentrated at Annual Conferences. A rough estimate of pledges at Lusaka is 
$500 million2^, though disentangling new money from broad pledges now made
concrete, distinguishing between Harare Industrial Workshop and Lusaka pledges
and evaluating both non-price tagged statements of intent with respect to
/
projects and bilateral project support within the SADCC coordination
priorities, but not pledged at a SADCC conference, makes any such figure 
remarkably imprecise. On the whole overall expressions of practical interest
and support seemed higher than at any conference since Maputo, a not
insignificant achievement in the present climate for aid.
Other themes included detailed consultations and speeding implementation. The
first was at least partly catered for by the inauguration of official level
sectoral workshops the day before the International Conference proper.
2 üImplementation criticisms arose from both donors - especially the UK - and 
SADCC members and coordinating states. The Chairman in his closing address 
stressed the need for more direct discussion of problems by donors with
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25members and coordinating units at a specific project level.
A lively discussion on agricultural policy developed with the Nordic States2^,
the African Development Bank,2^ EEC2^ and the USA2  ^ among the major 
20contributors. The themes of greater food self sufficiency and more research 
as well as of emphasis on supporting expanded peasant production and providing 
incentives were common to most contributions of which the Nordic was the most
comprehensive. Emphasis on prices, availability of goods, transport, 
marketing and the effectiveness of public sector institutions varied - as did 
SADCC state responses especially as several of the topics (e.g. producer 
prices) are national rather than SADCC areas of coordination.
A main controversy before and during the Conference came over the terms of 
USAID's proposed funding of the bulk of the $18 million regional sorghum and 
millet research project - a potential model for coordinated, field tested, 
applied research which is almost totally lacking in Sub-Saharan Africa. AID'S 
offer specifically excluded project components in Angola, Mozambique and 
Tanzania and any benefit going to these states. This proved unacceptable to 
SADCC whose unity held up against this clearly (whether intentionally or net)
*
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divisive offer. A potential resolution seemed to be USAID financing of the 
regional core of the work to "benefit the entire region" and the components in 
six countries (specified positively not negatively) with a seond donor 
(possibly CIDA of Canada) to fund the balance.^1
32The Chairman's opening address-’ highlighted both the progress made and the
three overarching problems - adverse international economic environment,
drought and South African destabilisation - confronting SADCC and its members.
His closing address-^  stressed the need for more and more frequent exchange of
views on policies and on implementation at technical and official levels as
well as political - a development begun by the sectoral workshops held the day
34before SADCC proper and by the Nordic paper in agricultural policies-’ as well
as by EEC Commissioner Pisani's posing of what he saw as basic challenges in
35agriculture, trade and priority setting.
q C
The Communique included a summary of attendance, broad endorsement of 
programmes, expression of satisfaction with the greater opportunity for 
dialogue and discussion and recognition of the external economic and
especially drought problems' burden on the region. Its somewhat enegmatic and
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guarded welcome to possible South African adoption of less agressive policies 
sprang from uncertainty as to actual South African intentions and its warning 
that continued international pressure was needed from bitter experience with 
South African words and deeds. In both his addresses the Chairman cited the
need for more active international action to bring pressure against South 
Africa to halt aggression and destabilisation pointing out that appeals for a 
renunciation of violence should be directed to Pretoria not SADCC Lusaka as
"neither SADCC nor its member states have instituted or practiced violence in
-57regard to South Africa's internal problems."-^ Commonwealth Secretary General 
Sridath Ramphul made a similar call for solidarity and international action to 
protect the independent states of Southern Africa and to liberate Namibia from
South Africa even more forcefully and was sharply critical of at least some
Western States lack of action to contain, and/or "constructive engagement"
O Q
with, South Africa.
The SADCC meeting's invited guests were given an object lesson in how 
vulnerable to weather the region is when a cyclone lashed Mozambique and 
Swaziland with the loss of hundreds of lives, tens of millions of dollars of
damage, severe damage to transport and communications and further loss of
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crops and livestock.^ While direct pledges at Lusaka were limited, the 
immediacy and presentation of this debacle to the Conference seems to have had 
an impact on bilateral followup.
For the first time the SADCC International Conference was preceeded by an NGO
conference on SADCC organised by War on Want. The 35 participating
organisations studied SADCC’s programme, discussed with SADCC and member state
participants in the main conference and adopted a resolution of support for
SADCC including a commitment to continuing liaison as well as educational and
40support work in their home countries. This was welcomed by SADCC Chairman 
Peter Mmusi in his closing address where he noted that the NGO statement would 
be included in the official Lusaka SADCC proceedings volume.
RSA's De-esculation Initiatives: Problematic Puzzles
Over the first quarter of 1984 the Republic of South Africa sought and 
concluded accords aimed at reducing levels of overt hostility between itself 
and Angola (Lusaka Accords) and Mozambique (Maputo Pact) . These have 
generally been presented as a near unconditional triumph for South Africa and
18-
defeat for The Front Line States and Liberation Movements and
ii iconsequentially - for SADCC. They have been seen as a first step toward a
revived and less formalized Constellation plan given the penumbra of trade,
tourism, investment issues discussed on the fringes of the main security
42negotiations leading to the Maputo Pact and with some other states in the 
region over the same period. The reality is much more complex and 
problematic, especially for SADCC.
42The Maputo Pact (or Nkomati Accord ) was in part forced on Mozambique by the 
cumulative impact of the South African (and previously Rhodesian) trained, 
supplied, financed and logistically supported MNR (National Resistance 
Movement). The MNR had - especially in the context of an economy increasingly 
debilitated by a calamitous external balance position and severe drought - 
gravely eroded Mozambique's economic and social as well as security fabric. 
In respect to SADCC’s programme it had made re-equipment and renovation of the 
Limpopo Valley and Beira rail lines well nigh impossible as well as probably 
deterring financial mobilization for those programmes. The decision to take 
up the South African initiative was fairly clearly President Machel's, based 
on security not economc or technical advice, but the economic costs had become
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a threat to survival - very literally for the drought stricken areas in the 
South to whom MNR raids made food distribution impossible.
South Africa however faced a major problem (beyond the cost of MNR support and 
raids in terms of money, South African lives and increasing annoyance of the
USA and Western Europe) because the MNR endangered the continuation of
effective FRELIMO government in Mozambique while itself clearly not viable
even as a puppet regime. Maputo is the third largest general cargo port for 
RSA. Without the 13-15? of its total power bought from Cabora Basa, South
Africa's ESCOM would have to engage in wholesale load shedding and brownouts. 
The MNR (in almost its only signs of an independent will) had off and on 
blasted Cabora Basa power pylons (with resultant Rand brownouts) and in early 
1984 seems to have attacked the Rand-Maputo rail line as well as threatening 
to sabotage Maputo harbour facilities. Barring actual RSA occupation of 
Maputo, Cabora Basa and corridors from both to the Republic, a pressing South 
African economic need for de-esculation existed.
Whether the economic link discussion will lead to anything is unclear. They 
were clearly not seen as central by either side. Whether RSA really intends
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to provide finance for general imports or for investment beyond augmenting 
Maputo and Cabora Basa facilities is unclear; as is Mozambique's response to 
any large scale reforging of economic links. Because increased capacity at 
Cabora Basa would allow power sales to Zimbabwe and Swaziland - as well as for 
a firmer supply base for the proposed national grid - and more facilities at 
Maputo are a key SADCC (and especially Zimababwean) priority, RSA finance for 
these is problematic in its impact on strengthening regional as opposed to RSA 
links.
If the MNR really is not resupplied then within 12 to 18 months its ability to
sabotage transport routes should be trivial. That opens the door for
proceeding with the Maputo and Beira port/access route programmes which would
radically reduce Zimbabwe's, Zambia's, Botswana's and potentially Swaziland's
dependence on South African ports and access routes. The economic logic for
such a shift is very clear: Mozambique needs transit revenues while the longer
routes to East London cost the SADCC states far more than those through
44Mozambique would - $Z40 million a year in the Zimbabwean case.
The Lusaka Accord's medium term impact is even less clear. First, RSA is
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dragging its feet on actual troop withdrawals. Second, while the Republic has
de facto agreed to drop the MNR no such undertaking has been forthcoming in
respect to Unita - yet (albeit Jonas Savimbi's kidnapping of De Beer's 
European employees and threats to blow up US oil company installations 
suggests he fears such an evolution). Third, both RSA and Angola say they see 
this as a first step toward Namibian independence. Therefore in the short run 
the effect on SADCC is likely to be limited to the general reduction in 
economic and military pressures on Angola - to expect early repair and full
reopening of the Lobito Bay line seems over-optimistic.
Similarly it would be premature for SADCC to expect speedy accession of its 
tenth member - Namibia. RSA acts and statements are indeed straws in the 
wind, but (presumably deliberately) several winds in all directions. Ending 
the failed, high cost "forward policy" in Angola could mean a "retreat into 
laager" on the Orange River line (which is being fortified and given a command 
air base at Upington) or on the Kunene. SWAPO co-founder Herman Toivo ya 
Toivo's unconditional release could be a gesture toward negotiations with 
SWAPO or an attempt (almost certainly foredoomed) to create leadership 
problems for SWAPO. The internal "multiparty conference" could be playing out
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the old "internal settlement" game purely as a bargaining ploy or yet another 
(foredoomed) effort to create a "white government with black faces" which 
would have enough Namibian support to command international credibility. 
South Africa's clear use of unclear, complex and conflicting proposals to gain 
time may be until their own election or President Reagan's or until they see 
whether SWAPO can be crushed in Namibia given the Lusaka accords or something 
else. Probably RSA's leadership has not made up its mind and is not yet 
totally agreed.
Therefore, few definite projections can be made of the Maputo and Lusaka 
accords' effect on SADCC - even supposing RSA does in good faith cut off the 
MNR and pull out of Angola. The economic and military strains on both states 
would be reduced. In the case of Mozambique power and transit, transport 
capacity would probably be both repaired and expanded to the benefit both of 
RSA and of landlocked SADCC state reduction of dependence on RSA. What more 
may come - especially in the Angola/Namibian front - is exceedingly 
problematic if only because none of the main actors seems to be certain what 
its own medium term strategy (let alone that of the others) is. The accords
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do give RSA gains and costs as they do for Angola and Mozambique (and perhaps 
SWAPO); they do give the appearance of reducing the priority for SADCC 
transport routes while potentially increasing the possibility of strengthening 
them. Any confident scenario building at this stage is likely to look very 
odd in a year or two’s time.
Progress Toward Preferential Trade
The PTA had a difficult 1983-84. Its initial duty reduction list is now
scheduled for implementation as of July 1, 1984 although at least in March
doubts remained that it had been fully agreed. Meanwhile its Secretary
General had been fired - either for slowing the progress of PTA programmes,
conflicts with member states or rather imprudent verbal attacks on SADCC.
Former senior ECA official Bax Nomvete who supervised the PTA’s birth returned
45as Acting Secretary General.
On the other hand the PTA did increase its membership to 14 and enter into 
discussions with its most critical "Yet to Joins" - Angola, Botswana, 
Mozambique and Tanzania. Several of its potential members sent observers to
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its annual summit in Harare, December 19/20, 1983* At the summit Prime
Minister Mugabe as Chairman reiterated his support for PTA and expressed hope
46that the very slow start was now behind it. On the other hand some
observers felt several members were beginning to take the view that unless a
real programme came into being by the end of 1984 the PTA could be written
off. Zimbabwe business circles - usually viewed as among PTA’s firmest backers
- expressed concern that it remained at the level of idealistic politcal
rhetoric and suggested it should start with ’’modest bilateral trade 
47agreements".
In March 1984 the PTA inaugurated its Clearing House operated by the Bank of
Zimbabwe. It is to provide two monthly accountings of settlements due between
members. These are to be denominated in PTA Units of Account (UAPTA) based on
a dollar, yen, pound, franc, mark basket initially worth $1.30. Actual
payments, due within 15 days of accounting, are to be made through the Bank
for International Settlements in Basle. 48
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Kenya - Uganda - Tanzania: Toward Economic Reconciliation
The long saga of the dissolution of the East African Community  ^ ended on 
November 17, 1983 when Presidents Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya, Julius Nyerere of 
Tanzania and Milton Obote of Uganda met in Arusha to agree a formula for 
dividing EAC assets and liabilities and to chart guidelines for future 
economic cooperation.^0
49
The Kenya-Tanzania border was reopened at once and air services between their 
capitals by national carriers resumed early in 1984 while discussion on and 
repairs to lake ferry and rail links were put in hand. The surviving EAC 
institutions - East African Development Bank, Eastern and Southern African 
Management Training Institute, Soroti Flying School, East African 
Intra-University Committee and EAC Library Services - were restored to common
service status. Kenya and Tanzania exchanged lists with a view to agreeing on 
expanded trade on a less unbalanced basis (in 1982 Tanzania imported $10 
million from Kenya and exported less than one) with hard currency clearing.
The settlement provides for 42* of assets and liabilities to go to Kenya, 32* 
to Tanzania and 26% to Uganda with Kenya and Tanzania making payments in
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convertible currencies, provision of goods and services, provision of capital 
assets and/or reduction of claims on Uganda totalling about $200 million 
because the share of EAC assets physically in Uganda is far below 26?.
51While the immediate response - especially in Kenya - was euphoric, how much 
can be achieved how fast remains problematic. Kenya-Tanzania trade and two 
country tourist packages will rise, but probably quite modestly. Recreation 
either of EAC or of the Common Market is totally beyond the realm of short 
term possibilities. On the other hand, a climate of opinion and a record of 
successful bargaining has been created which should allow a pragmatic step by 
step buildup of economic cooperation.
The Kagera Basin and the Central Corridor
The Kagera Basin Authority continued to meet and to secure money for studies 
on Rusomo Falls Dam, a 2000 kilometre rail network and a telecommunications 
network.^2 The difficulty is that only the last appears to be likely to go 
ahead in the forseeable future (with ADB finance) since the first two would 
cost on the order of $85-100 and $2,000 million respectively.
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On the other hand "central corridor" transit links and traffic between 
Tanzania and its four landlocked neighbours made progress with substantial 
Belgian and EEC support. Included are completion of all weather road links to 
Rwanda and reconstruction of the Kigoma port facilities on Lake Tanganyika.
Regional Cooperation In Southern Africa: What Future?
The economic prospects of most SADCC states for the period 1984-1986 are poor.
The world metal markets are unlikely to recover nor are terms of trade
prospects for agricultural exports alluring. The external balance and
arrears/debt problems of Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, and on a
smaller scale Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi and increasingly Zimbabwe - are
daunting. For much of the region - Malawi is an exception and Tanzania may be
- crop prospects are poor. Zimbabwe will have to import over half a million
54tonnes of grain. Botswana's drought is also entering its fourth year. 
Survival and restructuring are the threads linking - not always fully 
interrelated - policies not rapid growth. The new South African de-esculation 
of destabilisation moves are problematic in their sincerity, stability and
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impact. None of this can help SADCC.
However, as demonstrated throughout 198 3 and at the Lusaka International
Conference, SADCC is a going concern with a built-in dynamic based on very 
active member participation and clear perceptions that many of its priorities 
are as critical to restructuring and cost reduction as to gaining greater 
economic autonomy (especially vis a vis South Africa). Therefore, continued 
progress is likely in existing sectors and by SADCC Mbabane in 1985 it is 
likely that an initial trade sector programme will have been agreed. 
Breakthroughs may also be achieved on financing for the three key port and 
access sytems - Beira, Dar es Salaam and Maputo - which are critical to moving
the overall transport and communication priorities within sight of attainment. 
The fact of tensions within SADCC over how to handle certain sectors and
issues is - to date - no sign of impending stagnation because the 
determination to reach consensus, and to do so by reinforcing rather than
eroding coordinated action, remains strong.
For other overlapping cooperation schemes, prospects are less clear, partly 
because they do not have the common political economic concerns of SADCC to
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give them urgency and partly because they are not seen as equally central to 
economic rehabilitation and restructuring. The "Central Corridor" transport 
buildup will continue - it is critical to the landlocked states and is 
accepted as a priority by Tanzania. The Kenya-Uganda-Tanzania rapprochement 
will not dissolve, but initial rather overblown hopes (especially in Kenya) 
will not be realized and the modesty of results may cause a relative loss of 
interest. The Kagera Basin Authority and the PTA face more problematic 
futures. Neither has managed to achieve much political economic sex appeal 
and both have gotten off to slow starts, a fact which (however unfairly) tells 
against them when crisis resolution is a top priority. However, neither is
i
moribund and if they can make some limited progress to retain visibility and 
credibility in 1984-85 they could become important in a future interlocking of 
regional economic cooperation/coordination groupings.
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